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Notes
Multidistrict Litigation: Termination of "Pretrial
Proceedings" Under Section 1407-Judicial
Experiments in Making the Practice
Meet the Purpose of the Act
As a result of large scale antitrust litigation' of the last decade,
Congress enacted the multidistrict litigation statute in 1968.' Codi-
fied in section 1407 of the Judicial Code, the statute provides:
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of
fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be trans-
ferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial pro-
ceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on
multidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon its determina-
tion that transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience
of effecient conduct of such actions. Each action so transferred
shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such
pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred
unless it shall have been previously terminated: Provided, however,
that the panel may separate any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim,
or third-party claim and remand any of such claims before the
remainder of the action is remanded.!
Although by the language of section 1407 transfer is solely for
pretrial purposes, transferee courts have made findings, elicited
stipulations and issued orders limiting the scope of the transferor
court when the case is remanded for trial on the merits." A growing
body of commentatry, therefore, criticizes section 1407,' or at least
I In the electrical equipment conspiracy actions, 1,912 separate actions con-
taining 25,714 claims were brought in thirty-six federal districts. Peterson & Mc-
Dermott, Multidistrict Litigation: New Forms of Judicial Administration, 56
A.B.A.J. 737 (1970).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970).
'Id.
4 See, e.g., In re Antibiotic Drugs, 320 F. Supp. 586 (J.P.M.L. 1970) (non-
settling cases were later transferred to a third district for trial, see Pfizer, Inc.
v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1970); Reidinger v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
329 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Ky. 1971) (partial summary judgment granted).
" McElhaney, A Plea for the Preservation of the "Worm's Eye View" in
Multidistrict Litigation, 37 J. AiR L. & COM. 49 (1971); Seeley, Procedures for
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the judicial interpretations of the statute.'
An examination of section 1407 and an evaluation of the criti-
cism reveal that a basic source of controversy stems from the failure
of Congress to establish, or the courts to devise, a practicable pro-
cedure to keep the operation of the statute within its express terms.
Section 1407 was designed to reduce congestion, avoid conflicting
discovery demands, conserve judicial resources and promote sound,
consistent results on the merits" by consolidating cases for pretrial
purposes. To follow the letter of the statute by prompt remand after
completion of discovery without any determination on the merits by
the transferee court would violate the spirit of the statute by cre-
ating the problems multidistrict transfer was intended to alleviate:
diverse courts facing lengthy trials on common questions; common
witnesses testifying at each of these trials; many judges familiarizing
themselves with volumes of common evidence; and the risk of con-
flicting determinations on the merits.
Although the courts have not spoken directly to this issue, a
material factor prompting the courts to stray from the exact lan-
guage of section 1407 by not immediately remanding these cases is
the reluctance to abandon the benefits attained through multidistrict
transfer. Transferee courts have, therefore, attempted to obviate
the necessity of repitition in the transferee districts. Three methods
have been used: (i) trial of a "test case" prior to remand of the
transferred cases; (ii) consolidation of all cases for trial in the
transferee or another district; and (iii) summary adjudication of
all or a part of the common issues. Each method has its difficulties;
none has proved satisfactory.
I. THE TEST CASE METHOD
Downey v. Trans World Airlines," brought after a mid-air colli-
sion near Dayton, Ohio, was one of thirteen actions filed in three
districts and consolidated under section 1407 in the Southern Dis-
Coordinated Multidistrict Litigation: A Nineteenth Century Mind Views with
Alarm, 14 ANTITRUST BULL. 91 (1969).
See the article by Mr. von Kalinowski in this issue.
Peterson and McDermott, supra note 1, at 743.
'Downey v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., Civil Action No. 3521 (S.D. Ohio
1970) (unreported); see In re Air Crash Disaster Near Dayton, Ohio, 310 F.
Supp. 798 (J.P.M.L. 1970).
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trict of Ohio.' After discovery was completed, the transferee court
selected one of the cases originally filed in that district and tried the
merits prior to remanding the transferred cases." The object of the
transferee court was to avoid multiple trials by application of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel to the remaining cases.
The weakness of this "test case" method, however, is that a "test
case" may not result in complete disposition of matters before the
court when plaintiffs are not pursuing the same legal theories or
are asserting claims against different defendants. For example, in
Downey, the "test case" involved allegations of negligence against
Trans World Airlines and the owner of the other plane. The jury
found negligence on the part of TWA but exonerated the owner of
the other plane. The plaintiffs suing only the "exonerated" defend-
ant were not collaterally estopped by the verdict and thus would
be able to retry their cases. Assuming the doctrine of mutu-
ality will not be applied, the class of persons bound by col-
lateral estoppel is generally smaller than the class that can take
advantage of it. Therefore, other plaintiffs will not be bound by the
previous decision in favor of the defendant against whom they are
asserting their claims, even though that defendant would have been
bound had the jury found him liable. If however, mutuality of es-
toppel is applied, the defendant would not be bound by any decision
that does not bind the plaintiff. This entitles a defendant to a sep-
arate trial against each plaintiff even though identical issues will be
litigated in each trial. The theory rejecting mutuality is that the
defendant's right to his day in court extends to the determination
of all the issues;" a judicial determination of those issues should
be conclusive of his right absent circumstances in which this would
be unjust. To illustrate: when a defendant is found liable, but the
jury awards a low damage figure, the defendant will not appeal.'
A successful variation of the "test case" method involved patent
litigation in which the transferee judge obtained stipulations from
'In re Air Crash Disaster Near Dayton, Ohio, 310 F. Supp. 798 (J.P.M.L
1970).
"McDermott, A Plea for the Preservation of the Public's Interest in Multi-
district Litigation, 37 J. AIR L. & COM. 423, 445 (1971).
"See Moore & Currier, Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TUL. L. REV. 301
(1961); F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE, 595-603 (1965); Note, 35 J. AIR L. & COM.
289 (1970).
"Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d
Cir. 1965).
1972]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
all parties agreeing to be bound by the results of the test case both
at trial and on appeal." District courts, however, have no coercive
power to force the parties to agree to such a stipulation,' and be-
cause of an unwillingness to cooperate among air crash specialists, 5
the applicability of this practice will be limited.
II. THE CONSOLIDATION METHOD
The second method employed by transferee courts to achieve the
goals of section 1407 is transfer pursuant to section 1404(a)" upon
the completion of pretrial proceedings. Section 1404(a) transfers
for both pretrial and trial proceedings were employed prior to the
inception of section 1407," and the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation has indicated that sections 1404(a) and 1407 may be
used in concert."8 The Panel has established a precedent of trans-
ferring multidistrict air crash cases to the district where the crash
occurred." This satisfies the provision of section 1404 (a) requiring
transfer to a district where the case "might have been brought."'"
"In re Butterfield Patent Infringement, 328 F. Supp. 513 (J.P.M.L. 1970).
This action may be unique because in each of 41 suits filed in 19 districts, the
plaintiff was the same person.
'" Federal rule 16 provides that in pretrial conferences the judge may attempt
to have the parties stipulate certain facts, but short of partial summary judgment
pursuant to rule 56(d) he has no power to force such a stipulation.
"McDermott, supra note 10, at 451.
"628 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970). Section 1404(a) provides: "For the con-
venience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may
transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought."
" See, e.g., Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964); Wright v. American
Flyers Airline Corp., 263 F. Supp. 865 (D.S.C. 1967).
" 28 U.S.C. following § 1407 (Supp. 1972), amending 28 U.S.C. following
5 1407 (1970) Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litiga-
tion. Rule 15(b) provides: "Each transferred action that has not been terminated
in the transferee court will be remanded to the district in which it is triable unless
an order has been made by the transferee judge transferring the action to the
transferee district under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C. 5 1406. In the latter
event an order of remand shall be unnecessary to authorize further proceedings
in the transferee district for all purposes including trial."
"In re Air Crash Disaster Near Dayton, Ohio, 310 F. Supp. 798, 799(J.P.M.L. 1970). "We have consistently held that the district containing the situs
of the crash is generally the most appropriate transferee district for litigation of
this type."
"The quoted phrase restricts transfer to a district in which venue would have
been proper had the suit been filed in that district. This requires reference to 28
U.S.C. § 1391, the general venue statute, or to one of the specific venue statutes
Thus, at the completion of pretrial proceedings consolidated under
section 1407, a section 1404(a) transfer of the cases for final dis-
position can be made to the judge who conducted the discovery
proceedings.
At the present time there is a dispute over the power of courts
operating within section 1407 to transfer the case under section
1404(a), specifically, whether the power is vested in the transferor
or the transferee court. 1 The conceptual difficulty is that after a
1407 transfer is made, the case is in the transferee court only for
pretrial purposes. Therefore, the transferee court obtaining jurisdic-
tion by section 1407 could have no more authority than that section
purports to convey. In Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord," the only case that di-
rectly confronts this issue, the Second Circuit held the order may be
made only by the transferee judge. In reaching this result, the Sec-
ond Circuit reasoned that a section 1407 transfer is a transfer of the
entire case, and once the Panel has ordered the transfer, the trans-
feror court has no jurisdiction until the Panel remands the case.'
Therefore, since the concurrent use of section 1407 and 1404(a)
transfers is permitted, and since the transferor court lacks jurisdic-
tion to transfer, the only court that can do so is the transferee court.
The court avoided the express language of section 1407 (a) by
finding that the mandatory remand provisions limit the power of
the Panel but not the power of the transferee judge. The court
bolstered this position by citing to the Panel's rules" that acknow-
ledge by implication the authority of the transferee judge to enter
a section 1404(a) order.'
The authority for successive transfers under sections 1407 and
1404(a) is Panel rule 15.2 It is more difficult, however, to find
authority for rule 15 itself. Section 1407 contains a sub-section
located elsewhere. In air crash litigation the claim founded on diversity of citizen-
ship may be brought where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside or where the
claim arose.
21 Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1971); von Kalinowski, supra
note 6.
22 Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1971).
21 id. at 124.
2428 U.S.C. § 1407(f) (1970) provides: The panel may prescribe rules for
the conduct of its business not inconsistent with Acts of Congress and with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
"Panel rule 15(b), supra note 18.
26 Id.
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giving the Panel rule-making power "not inconsistent with Acts of
Congress and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'"" The House
Judiciary Committee's report on the multidistrict litigation statute
noted that "section 1404(a) transfers are available in those in-
stances when transfer of a case for all purposes is desirable."" The
Panel may have used this language to support rule 15, but the valid-
ity of such an interpretation is questionable because the same House
report expressly limited multidistrict transfers to pretrial matters."
Having so limited the statute, it is doubtful whether Congress in-
tended to permit broader transfers by combining section 1407 with
the general transfer provisions of section 1404(a). The Panel has
twice amended rule 15 since Pfizer was decided." Each amendment
gives the transferee judge more discretion in determining the man-
ner in which transferred cases are handled after completion of pre-
trial proceedings. While these amendments make it clear that the
Panel approves of Pfizer, it is equally clear that the Panel's rule
making power is limited by the language of section 1407 and the
restrictive intent with which it was passed. Thus, before the issue
can be settled, an authoritative resolution of rule 15 must be made.
There are other conceptual difficulties with the result in Pfizer.
For example, it is assumed that after a section 1407 transfer has
been made, no court has jurisdiction for complete adjudication of
the case because the section 1407 transfer has divested the trans-
feror court of all jurisdiction while conferring only "pretrial juris-
diction" on the transferee court. Further, the transferee court
manufactures plenary jurisdiction by entering a section 1404(a)
motion ordering itself to transfer the case to itself for trial on the
merits. While the transfer in Pfizer was to a third district for
trial,"' an additional problem will arise in a case when the transferee
728 U.S.C. § 1407(f) (1970).
81968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 1898.
2° Id. at 1902. This statement appears to be the authority for the Panel's state-
ment that section 1407 and section 1404(a) may be used in combination. This
may be an incorrect interpretation of the House report in light of language in the
same paragraph stating the "experience of the Coordinating Committee [the fore-
runner of the Panel] was limited to pretrial matters, and the committee conse-
quently considers it desirable to keep this legislative proposal within the confines
of that experience."
"See 28 U.S.C. following § 1407 (Supp. 1972); 28 U.S.C.A. following S
1407 (July 1972 Supp.).
"1 Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1971). In Pfizer, Judge Lord
sat by designation in the Southern District of New York to preside over consoli-
court under section 1407 and under section 1404(a) are the same.
Section 1404 (a) allows transfer "to any other district or division;"
therefore making it impossible for the transferee court to satisfy the
requirements of section 1404 by transfer to itself.
The more logical rationale for multidistrict practice using the
consolidation method recognizes the jurisdiction of the transferor
court is not lost but rather abated, and the transferee court has
limited jurisdiction to the extent of the section 1407 transfer. Under
this view, the transferor court would be the proper source of a
section 1404(a) transfer. The practicality of this rationale is re-
stricted, however, because there would probably be conflicting de-
cisions on the propriety of the section 1404(a) transfer among the
various transferor courts, while under the Pfizer theory, the risk of
conflict does not exist because the transferor judge applies his de-
cision to all cases.
III. THE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT METHOD
The essence of the partial summary judgment method is that in
appropriate cases, the transferee judge who has supervised extensive
pretrial discovery proceedings will have become familiar with the
record and will be able to render summary judgment on the portions
of the case that have been established by these proceedings. This
method avoids duplication of effort in transferor districts on remand
and thus eliminates one of the major reasons for not remanding
transferred cases after discovery is complete. 2
Partial summary judgment is particularly suited to air disaster
litigation, since the actions are generally brought under the state
wrongful death statute. ' The particular statute applied depends
dated antibiotic drug antitrust actions. At the conclusion of pretrial proceedings
under section 1407, he transferred all actions to his home district in Minnesota
for trial. Both the plaintiffs and defendants objected to the sua sponte transfer
on grounds that a judge sitting under section 1407 has no power to transfer under
1404 and that even if he did, it was an abuse of discretion to transfer in this
case. The Court of Appeals refused to find an abuse of discretion even though
the district to which the actions were transferred contained none of the witnesses
or evidence and was the originating district for only one of the actions. The
transfer was due at least in part to the judge's inconvenience in being away from
his home district.
2 As indicated above, the reluctance of the courts to abide by the literal
meaning of section 1407 stems from the lack of an efficient method to terminate
the role of the transferee court.
" Wolcott, Collateral Estoppel and Other Practical Approaches to Commercial
Air Crash Claims, 13 N.Y.L.F. 509 (1967).
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upon the facts of the crash and upon the confficts of law rule of
the transferor state." The ability of the plaintiff to recover depends
on proof of negligence on the part of a defendant; two issues must
be determined-negligence and damages. The facts material to the
issue of negligence are those of causation common to all plaintiffs
and discoverable during consolidated pretrial proceedings. The
items material to the issue of damages characteristically include
matters most easily proven in the decedent's domicile such as his
income and income potential, his family responsibilities and his
position in the community.' A convenient practice, therefore, would
be to make a final adjudication of liability in a consolidated pro-
ceeding in one forum with a separate trial and adjudication of
damages in the forum located in the plaintiff's domicile. In appro-
priate cases," partial summary judgment can be used for achieving
this result, as contemplated both by Congress" and by the Panel. "8
While the issue of damages is ordinarily incapable of being estab-
lished as a matter of law, the evidence upon which liability issues
are to be decided in aviation accident cases lends itself to summary
adjudication. Air crashes often result in the death of the cockpit
crew (the witnesses whose testimony would bear most significantly
on the case). Consequently, preparation of an air crash case centers
on reconstruction and expert analysis of the last moments of flight
by collecting data from the cockpit voice recorder, the flight re-
corder, the reports of the air traffic controllers and the wreckage
of the aircraft. This information is provided by the National Trans-
portation Safety Board report or can be obtained through deposi-
'Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964) requires the transferee court
to apply the conflicts of law principle which the transferor court would have
applied. In these cases, the transferee judge is faced with complex problems due
to his unfamiliarity with the laws of other states.
ARepresentation of Survivors, 11 AM. JuR. TRIALS § 12-17 (1966).
"Although rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits sep-
arate trials on the issues of negligence and damages, a jury determination of
liability in the transferee court followed by remand and a subsequent jury deter-
mination of damages is impossible under a section 1407 transfer because of the
limited nature of the transfer and because of constitutional objection arising from
the fact that different juries would decide the issues of liability and damages,
possibly denying the parties of a jury trial as guaranteed by the seventh amend-
ment. See O'Donnell v. Watson Bros. Trans. Co., 183 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Ill.
1960); Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials: An Example of
Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 Vand. L. Rev. 831 (1961).
37 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 1898, 1900.
38 J.P.M.L., Manual for Complex & Multidistrict Litigation, § 2.11 (1970).
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tions.' This evidence is no more lucid when presented in the court-
room than if studied by a judge in chambers since the traditional
opportunities for observation of demeanor and impeachment do
not exist in absence of live witnesses. Furthermore, under the rules
of the Panel, the transferee judge will have presided over numerous
pretrial conferences ° and will be thoroughly familiar with the
record and with many intangibles that cannot be reflected in the
record.
Reidinger v. Trans World Airlines" was an air disaster case that
employed this method. In November 1967, a Trans World Airlines
flight crashed as it made its landing approach to the Greater Cin-
cinnati Airport, killing seventy of the eighty-two persons aboard.'
Fourteen actions were brought in six federal districts, all of which
were transferred to the Eastern District of Kentucky."5 After more
than two years of discovery, the transferee judge granted motions
for summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and two of three
defendants." Trans World Airlines argued that the air traffic con-
trollers had negligently failed to reroute the flight to a runway where
all navigational aids were operative and the United States as the
employer of the controllers was therefore liable. The defendant
airline also asserted that the manufacturer of the altimeter was
liable for improper design. The district court held: (i) the air traf-
fic controllers had performed their obligation by giving correct in-
formation to the pilot, and the United States could not be liable as
a matter of law; and (ii) there was no evidence to support the al-
legations against the instrument manufacturer. ' On interlocutory
appeal," the Sixth Circuit reversed," holding that in air crash cases,
"See generally, Speiser, Aviation Negligence Trials, 13 N.Y.L.F. 498 (1967);
Airline Passenger Death Cases, 8 AM. JUR. TRIALS 173 (1965).
,
0J.P.M.L., Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation, § 1.1 (1970).
41329 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Ky. 1971). The airport is located in Kentucky
across the river from Cincinnati.
4 2Id.
," In re Air Crash Disaster at the Greater Cincinnati Airport, 298 F. Supp.
353 (J.P.M.L. 1968). This count does not include 37 "tag along" cases transferred
during the next six months.
"Reidinger v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Ky. 1971).
4 5 Id. at 491.
4628 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
" Reidinger v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., - F.2d - (6th Cir. 1972) (Civ.
Nos. 71-1721 through 71-1735).
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as in other tort cases, summary judgment is improper when there
are conflicting factual contentions.'
In rendering this decision, the Sixth Circuit mechanically fol-
lowed the time honored rule that determinations of negligence are
peculiarly within the province of the trier of fact, making summary
judgment proper only in rare cases." The validity of this reasoning
is questionable in the light of the facts of this case and more funda-
menfly with reference to the applicability of the general rule in
the context of complex, multidistrict litigation; it allows a party to
prolong final disposition of the suit notwithstanding strong evidence
against him merely by making controverting contentions unsup-
ported by any evidence.
The rule that issues of negligence are rarely susceptible of sum-
mary adjudication is well established and will not be quickly
abandoned. An analogous device, the directed verdict, was historic-
ally subject to the same "scintilla" rule' that the Sixth Circuit
applied in Reidinger. A majority of states, however, have now aban-
doned the scintilla rule and have established more liberal standards
for directed verdicts.' In a situation such as Reidinger when proof
will come from documents and reports and will not depend on de-
meanor or credibility of witnesses, insisting that an issue be decided
by a jury becomes a merely a matter of form. The time has come to
abandon the "scintilla rule" as applied to partial summary judgment
motions in air crash cases. Unless a party is able to controvert his
adversary's motion for summary judgment and can support his
contentions with evidence, the motion should be granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
On balance, the "partial summary judgment" method of adjudi-
48 Id.
'Id. See also 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 56.17[42] (1971) and the
cases cited therein.
"The common law rule was that a "mere scintilla of evidence" was sufficient
to overrule a motion for directed verdict and send a case to the jury, but this
rule has been abandoned by most courts. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 5 2494 (3d
ed. 1940); see also, Note, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 322 (1968). Reidinger is an ex-
treme case of "scintilla rule" reasoning because here, there was no evidence pro-
duced in discovery to support Trans World Airlines' contentions, whereas at least
a "scintilla" of evidence is required to resist a motion for directed verdict under
the older view.
3"9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2494 (3d ed. 1940).
cating multidistrict cases appears to be the best of the three alterna-
tives. It achieves all that section 1407 was designed to accomplish.
Additionally, it simplifies conflict of laws problems and retains a
modicum of respect for the plaintiff's choice of forum. An opti-
mistic thought for those similarly inclined is that the superficial
level of analysis by the Sixth Circuit in Reidinger may permit an-
other court dealing with this problem to distinguish Reidinger for
its failure to recognize the special problems of multidistrict litiga-
tion."
Had the "test case" method been applied in Reidinger, only the
plaintiffs pursuing the same legal theory as the test case would be
bound by the determination. Thus, the "crew plaintiffs" who sued
the instrument company and the United States would not be bound
by the jury finding that only Trans World Airlines was negligent.
Had the consolidation method been applied, the transferee court
would have had to determine which wrongful death statute applied
to each plaintiff, and then would have to try the consolidated issue
of liability, then the damage issues of each case separately. It is
submitted that the consolidation method is inappropriate for air
crash litigation because of the extensive evidence that must be heard
on damage issues that are unique to each plaintiff, because of the
influence of state law and because of the highly personal nature of
a wrongful death suit that does not lend itself to consolidated ad-
judication.
Courts may find it useful to experiment with a combination of
these methods. For example, given the Reidinger facts but with a
stronger showing of negligence on the part of the instrument manu-
facturer, partial summary judgment could have been entered in
favor of the air traffic controllers and a test case could have been
used to dispose of the remaining issues in the case, to the extent
that the legal theories of the parties were identical.
The superiority of the "partial summary judgment" method ob-
tains only in situations when the facts are clearly established. While
Reidinger is an ideal factual situation for the determination of all
liability issues by partial summary judgment, in less clear-cut cases
51 The failure of the trial court and of the appellate court to draft their opin-
ions in terms of multidistrict litigation rather than treating this matter as simply
a question of tort law may limit the value of Reidinger as a precedent. Regardless
of the result, in light of the recent creation of the multidistrict statute and the
uncertainties previously described a clarification would have been in order.
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this method can be used only to a limited extent. To the extent
used, however, it can simplify and hasten the final disposition of
each case.
Robert A. McCulloch
CAB Approval of IATA Rate Agreements: The Evolution
of the Standard of Public Interest Under Section 412
of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
Section 414 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958' exempts agree-
ments between air carriers from the operation of the antitrust laws
when the Civil Aeronautics Board finds them not to be adverse to
the public interest pursuant to section 412.' The criteria applied by
the CAB in making this determination for agreements submitted by
the International Air Transport Association form the subject of this
note.
In 1946, IATA submitted a resolution to the CAB that estab-
lished the machinery for implementing the organization's objec-
tives,' including the establishment of world-wide regional traffic
conferences for the purpose of considering rates and "all [other]
international air traffic matters involving passengers, cargo, and
the handling of mail."' When this proposal was made, the only
power the CAB possessed over individual rates set by American
international air carriers was that the Board could determine and
prescribe just and reasonable maximum or minimum rates for over-
seas air transportation. The exercise of this power was limited to
situations when the carrier's rates were found to be unjustly dis-
149 US.C. 5 1384 (1970). This section provides: "Any person affected by any
order under section . . . 1382 of this [Act] shall be . . . relieved from the opera-
tions of the 'antitrust laws' . . . ."
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 412, 49 U.S.C. § 1382 (1970). Section
1382(a) provides: "Every air carrier shall file with the Board a true copy . . .
of every contract or agreement . . . affecting air transportation, . . . between
such air carrier and any other air carrier, foreign air carrier, or other carrier
. . . relating to the establishment of transportation rates, fares, charges, or
classifications .. " Section 1382(b) provides: "The Board shall by order dis-
approve any such contract or agreement, whether or not previously approved
by it, that it finds to be adverse to the public interest, or in violation of this
[Act], and shall by order approve any such contract or agreement . . . that it
does not find to be adverse to the public interest, or in violation of this [Act] ..
3 IATA Traffic Conference Resolution, 6 C.A.B. 639 (1946).
1 Id. at 640. Other matters to be considered by the traffic conferences were:
tariffs and schedules; general conditions of carriage; traffic forms, documents and
procedures; reservation codes and procedures; government forms, regulations,
and procedures; ethics of advertising and publicity; and, all matters pertaining
to agents.
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criminatory.' The CAB noted, however, that by virtue of sections
412 and 414, it could exert substantial power over the rates set
by American international carriers when those carriers entered
into rate agreements with each other or with foreign carriers.' In
granting temporary approval to the IATA resolution, the Board
considered the effect the rate agreements would have upon com-
petition and concluded the Act requires "regulated competition"
that avoids both the "stifling influence of monopoly" and the "eco-
nomic anarchism of unrestrained competition."'
Since the first IATA rate proposal was submitted, the CAB has
not applied a consistent standard in determining whether IATA
agreements are "adverse to the public interest." Critics of the Board
contend that the Board does not fully consider the public interest
when it approves IATA rate agreements and therefore, the Board,
in effect, subsidizes the IATA carriers.!
I. PUBLIC INTEREST
From the outset, the Board recognized that the term "public
interest" encompasses more than a general reference to "the public
welfare";' public interest must have a direct relationship to the
statutory function of the CAB, which is "the promotion of ade-
quate, economical and efficient service by air carriers at reasonable
charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or ad-
vantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices."'*
When IATA submitted its first rate agreement, involving North
Atlantic carriers, the Board stated that the rate structure failed to
show a "reasonable relation between any conference rates and the
attainable costs of operation", and therefore concluded that the
5 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 §§ 1002(d), (f), 49 U.S.C. S§ 1482(d), (f)
(1970). These same provisions were contained in the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938 §§ 1002(d), (f), 52 Stat. 973, at 1018-19, as were sections 412 and 414.
See also Gazdik, Rate-Making and the IATA Traffic Conferences, 16 J. Ant L.
& COM. 298 (1949).
6 IATA Traffic Conference Resolution, 6 C.A.B. 639, 643 (1946).
lId. at 643-44.
'See, e.g., the article by Mr. Pillai in this issue.
OIATA Agreement Providing for North Atlantic Passenger Fares, 10 C.A.B.
330, 331 (1949).
1Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 102, 49 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (1970) (formerly
section 2(c) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938).
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agreement was adverse to the public interest." Accordingly, for
future agreements to be approved as being in the public interest,
IATA would be required to submit operating cost analyses enabling
a comparison with the rate structures submitted for approval.
In Local Cartage Agreement Case,' the CAB disapproved an
agreement between certain domestic air carriers to terminate the
practice of tendering advance payments to independent truckers
for services to be rendered to shippers of airfreight. In applying
the public interest standard, the Board determined that the agree-
ment's relation to the antitrust laws could not be ignored, since
approval under section 412 automatically exempts the agreement
from the operation of the antitrust laws under section 414." The
Board therefore concluded that when an agreement contains "ele-
ments significantly repugnant to antitrust principles," approval
must be denied "unless there is a clear showing that the agreement
is required by a serious transportation need or in order to secure
important public benefits.""
The Board has subsequently applied the Local Cartage Agree-
ment case standard to certain IATA agreements, requiring either
a showing of "serious transportation need" or "important public
benefits" to be derived," but has not consistently applied this stand-
ard to all IATA agreements. For example, in IATA Credit Agree-
ments,"' the Board disapproved an agreement because there had
not been a clear showing of "serious transportation need" or "im-
portant public benefits"; on the other hand, in IATA Group Fares
Agreement and IATA Agreements re Passenger Fares," the CAB
approved agreements without even mentioning the Local Cartage
Agreement case standard." Thus, it was not clear when this stand-
ard would be applied to IATA agreements, if it would be applied
at all.
" North Atlantic Traffic Conference, 6 C.A.B. 845, 849 (1946).
"2Local Cartage Agreement Case, 15 C.A.B. 850 (1952).
Is Id. at 853.
14 Id.
"See, e.g., IATA Credit Agreements, 30 C.A.B. 1553 (1960).
"Id. at 1555. The resolution provided that no IATA member should honor
a passenger credit card other than a U.A.T.P. card or a member's credit card.
17 36 C.A.B. 33 (1962).
"38 C.A.B. 1062 (1963).
"In both cases, the Board merely talked in terms of the public interest re-
quirement found in section 412.
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II. THE CHALLENGE FROM THE SUPPLEMENTALS
In the early 1960's, the American supplemental carriers, which
provide group fare charter services, challenged IATA rate agree-
ments as being violative of antitrust principles." In IATA Group
Fares Agreement," the supplementals contended that the IATA
group fare proposal would effectively eliminate the supplementals
from the transatlantic market and that group fares would be un-
justly discriminatory." The Board held the agreement was not ad-
verse to the public interest since the group fares would provide a
"means of meeting the public need for the lowest attainable eco-
nomic fare level." 3 The CAB disposed of the supplementals' argu-
ments, stating that the facts did not prove that non-IATA compe-
tition would be eliminated from the market and in view of the
public interest factors favoring the reduced fares, restrictions on
eligibility would not render them unjustly discriminatory.' Since
the Board did not apply the Local Cartage Agreement standard,"
but merely approved the agreement on the basis of nebulous public
interest factors, it was uncertain what standard the CAB would
apply when an agreement was challenged as being violative of
antitrust principles. Thus, the problem lay in formulating a standard
that would satisfy the principles of both antitrust law and the public
interest.
In 1969, the CAB approved an IATA North Atlantic rate agree-
ment despite the challenge of the supplementals, which were repre-
sented by the National Air Carrier Association (NACA). In May
1970, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed
the Board's order, holding that the findings were insufficient to
support approval of the fares in view of the substantial antitrust
questions that must be considered. ' Although the court did not
determine whether the agreement violated antitrust principles, it
stated that when serious antitrust questions are presented, the Board
"
0 See, e.g., IATA Group Fares Agreement, 36 C.A.B. 33 (1962).
21 Id.2 1 Id. at 34. The fares reflected a 38 per cent reduction from normal round-trip
economy class fares and would be available to groups of persons that could dem-
onstrate a prior affinity.
23 Id. at 44.
2
4 Id. at 39, 41.
2 See note 19 supra.
"Nat'l Air Carrier Ass'n v. CAB, 436 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
cannot avoid them by merely finding that the public will benefit
from the approval of the rate agreement; the Board must first
answer the antitrust question: "whether the existence of a market
structure conducive to maximum feasible competition will be im-
periled by the approval of the agreement....
The 1969 IATA agreement expired while the appeal was pend-
ing when one of the carriers withdrew. Subsequently, a new agree-
ment retaining many of the 1969 fare agreement provisions was
submitted, and the CAB approved all of the fare proposals in the
new agreement." In May 1971, the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia held the CAB had sufficiently considered the
antitrust questions by considering the impact the fares would have
on competitors and affirmed the CAB's order." In disposing of
NACA's contentions, the court noted the recent Statement of In-
ternational Air Transportation Policy of the United States" directed
"the [g]overnment ... not to allow enjoyment of the right to per-
form both scheduled service and charter service to result in decisive
competitive advantages for scheduled carriers."'" The court con-
cluded that since an intent of the scheduled carriers to aggrandize
their share of the market is assumed, the test for antitrust violations
is not the existence of this intent, but "whether the particular means
devised for the effectuation of this intent unduly jeopardize a
'market structure conducive to maximum feasible competition.' "s,
An important aspect of the 1971 opinion is the court's discussion
of the applicability of the Local Cartage Agreement standard to
IATA agreements.' Over NACA's objection to the Board's view
that the Local Cartage Agreement standard was not strictly ap-
plicable to every IATA agreement, the court noted that the CAB
had already concluded that the making of fares by IATA is not per
se adverse to the public interest; the filing of an IATA rate agree-
ment does not always present the "question of whether the agree-
27Id. at 194.
28Id. at 188-89.
29Nat'l Air Carrier Ass'n v. CAB, 442 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
106 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 804 (June 29, 1970); 63
Dep't State Bull. 86 (July-Dec. 1970).
31 63 Dep't State Bull. 86, 88 (July-Dec. 1970).
"Nat'l Air Carrier Ass'n v. CAB, 442 F.2d 862, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Nat'l
Air Carrier Ass'n v. CAB, 436 F.2d 185, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
31Nat'l Air Carrier Ass'n v. CAB, 442 F.2d 862, 870-71 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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ment is a violation of the antitrust laws. ' Accordingly, the Board
can proceed directly to determine whether the agreement is adverse
to the public interest; if the Board, however, finds that the agree-
ment is "unfairly designed and directed in purpose and effect to
the elimination of legitimate competitors," then it is not within the
public interest. ' Thus, the Board's decision must be viewed in terms
of "whether the existence of a market structure conducive to maxi-
mum feasible competition will be imperiled by approval of the
agreement." '
HI. OPEN COMPETITION
As observed earlier, the Board has approved the concept of
rate-making by IATA and has determined that the resulting con-
trol of international scheduled carriers afforded the CAB is a de-
sirable goal."7 The alternative to IATA rate-making would be to
allow each individual carrier to set their own rates and file individ-
ual tariffs with the CAB. Such open rate competition, however, can
have a disastrous effect on American carriers since the CAB has
little control over the rates set by individual foreign carriers.
In August 1971, the members of JATA could not reach an
agreement concerning North Atlantic fares effective in February
1972. Consequently, several foreign carriers filed individual tariffs
containing significant rate reductions.3' Notwithstanding the Board's
authority to require that discriminatory fares be discontinued,"
the Board could do very little to control the rates set by the foreign
carriers."' This lack of power to deal with the impending open rate
situation was brought to the attention of Congress and a bill was
Id. at 870.
Id. The court did note, however, that even though it was not clear how the
Local Cartage standard differed from the statutory public interest standard, the
record seemed to indicate that the Board found that the standard was met in this
case by evidence of both "serious transportation need" and "important public
benefits."
6 Id. at 871.
37 IATA Traffic Conference Resolution, 6 C.A.B. 639 (1946); see also IATA
Traffic Conference Resolution, 9 C.A.B. 221 (1948).
3* TIME, Sept. 6, 1971, at 58.
39 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 §§ 1002(d), (f), 49 U.S.C. §5 1482(d), (f),
(1970).
"o See text at notes 1-5 supra.
introduced giving the Board direct authority over foreign carriers."1
At subsequent hearings, a NACA representative presented evidence
indicating the disastrous effect the foreign carrier rates would have
on both American supplemental and scheduled carriers.'* On March
22, 1972, a bill was passed amending the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 to give the CAB authority, subject to disapproval by the Presi-
dent, to suspend or reject tariffs in international air transportation
the CAB finds to contain unlawful rates.' When exercising its new
powers, the CAB is required to consider: the need in the public
interest for low-cost and efficient transportation; the need of the
individual air carrier for revenue sufficient to offer efficient trans-
portation; and, whether the rates will tend to monopolize competi-
tion."
IV. CONCLUSION
As a result of the 1970 and 1971 NACA cases and the 1972
amendments to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, it is clear that
both the courts and Congress have seen fit to impose a duty on the
CAB to consider the effect of IATA rate agreements on competi-
tion, as well as the provision of low-cost and efficient air transpor-
tation. Thus, the CAB is now equipped with a standard that can
consistently be applied to IATA agreements to effectively protect
the public interest. In addition, by virtue of the 1972 amendments,
the CAB is now given power to protect the public interest when
rates are set on an individual basis rather than through the IATA
conference machinery.
Arthur L. Dent III
41 S. 2423, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
'Hearings on S. 2423 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Comm. on
Commerce, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. at 48 (1971). The president of NACA, Mr.
Edward J. Driscoll, pointed out that the proposal submitted by Lufthansa would
cause Pan American to lose approximately $42 million and TWA $37.5 million.
In addition, the supplementals would sustain about a 19 per cent reduction over
1970 yields.
41 Act of March 22, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-259, 86 Stat. 96.
-Id. § 1002(j)(5).
19721 NOTES

Federal
Procedure
And
Aviation
Litigation

